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Preface 
The following illustrations and text were developed for use 
in presentations dealing with U.S. energy policy. The illustra-
tions identify some of the major participants in the current 
energy policy debate, depicting their role, both as contributors 
to the problem and to it's solution. While everyone has a stake 
in the outcome of a national energy policy, it is possible to show 
only selected "actors•• that are intended to be representative of 
the major interest groups involved. 
The focus is on medium term policy that addresses the expected 
"1985" s~pply shortfall in world oil production. The anticipated 
price rise for world oil will cause serious economic problems --
hence the emphasis on showing the economic aspects of the "Invisi-
ble Crisis". Therefore, the cross section of energy producers and 
consumers focuses on oil suppliers and users. 
Portions of the illustrations are very time specific. For 
example, since we are in the midst of a first national debate on 
energy policy, we have a "Carter Proposal" and a "View From Congress". 
These will soon evolve into a National Energy Plan. This time 
specific material will be updated at the appropriate time. 
The central theme of the presentation is that energy can no 
longer be treated as an abundant resource. Low price and perceived 
abundance have allowed us to be wasteful both as producers and 
consumers. All of us, then, must bear part of the responsibility 
for makingthe adjustments and sacrifices dictated by the approach-
ing shortages and higher prices. This will be accomplished jointly 
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by market and non-market (public policy) forces. Private interests 
are necessarily strongly represented in the national debate. The 
emerging policy will represent a compromise between these special 
interests and a broader national interest. It is an initial step. 
The national debate on energy policy will not terminate with this 
first plan, but will likely be an important policy issue for many 
years. 
Companion education materials include (l) full page illustra-
tions to be used for overhead transparencies (ESS-558) and (2) a 
slide and cassette tape set. 
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THE INVISIBLE CRISIS 
ENERGY POLICY ALONG 
THE ROAD TO 1985 ... AND BEYOND 
by Norman Rask, Extension Economist 
The energy problem has been called "The Invisible Crisis". 
For those of us who live in the present, it may sound like this: we 
have plenty of gas at the pump, the pipe line is flowing from the 
North Slope, North Sea oil is coming on stream, there is plenty of 
oil on the continental shelf, etc., etc., etc. So what's all the 
fuss about? 
Others, however, \vho attempt to look at general trends over 
time see some ominous indicators in recent energy production and 
use figures. U.S. production of natural gas and oil, for example, 
peaked in the early 1970's and has declined since. The North Slope 
oil will stabilize this downward trend for a few years only. Bean-
while, our demand will continue to increase along with more imports 
of oil, which are already running at about one-half of our use. 
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THE INVISIBLE CRISIS 
ENERGY POLICY ALONG 
THE ROAD TO 1985 AND BEYOND 
[ 1] 
They see a problem developlng down the road and around the 
bend say about 1985 [1). This will not be a small problem such 
as the OPEC prlce increases of the early 1970's, but a major 
prlce change that will cause serious economic consequences for 
the world economy. It is already quite late to begin preparation 
for thls "Invisible Crisis"; however, any action we take now will 
help cushion the economic shock waiting for us down the road 
a few years from now. Contlnuing with a "business as usual" 
phllosophy will only add to the problem later on. 
How did we get into this fix? Why are there so many con-
flicting opinions? What are the general trends that most "experts" 
agree on? Let's look at these questions and others in summary 
form as a background for understandlng the current policy debate. 
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The Energy Problem - A Summary 
The present confusion over 
the energy situation results 
from a rapid change in our THE ENERGY PROBLEM - A SUMMARY 
perception of energy [2]. 
I. CONFUSION 
We have moved from a per-
-- NO EXPERTS 
ceived abundance and low -- NO CENTRAL POLICY 
-- Ll TILE DIRECTION 
price for energy a few years 
-- FEW SPECIFIC FACTS 
ago, to the present concern 
[ 2] 
over scarce supplies and sharply higher prices. 
This swift change in perspective has caught us unprepared. 
There is considerable confusion, as well as credibility problems, 
as we try to sort things out. The major effort we are now under-
taking to formulate an energy policy requires people who are 
"expert" in energy questions, a broad base of well tested data and 
informa~ion, and a philosophy about energy use t~at can help us 
organize the facts and design an equitable long range pollcy. 
Unfortunately, this all takes time to develop, and we have started 
late. 
A general concensus and acceptance, however, seems to be 
emerging on some broad 
questions [3]. Following 
a temporary drop ln energy 
use, consumption has con-
tinued to rise in recent 
years at near the pre-1970 
growth levels of 3-4 percent 
per year. 
2 TRENDS - SOME AGREEMENT 
ENERGY USE IS INCREASING (3 -4% PER YEARl 
RUNNING OUT OF GAS AND OIL 
IMPORTS ARE INCREASING 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS DECREASING 
-- WORLD PRODUCTION APPROACHING CAPACITY 
(3] 
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Imports of oil have 
increased substantially, 
even at the higher prices, 
while domestic production 
of both gas and oil has 
fallen off since 1970. 
The continued availability 
of imports, however, may 
come under stress within 
3. AlTERNATIVE FUELS - GENERAL AGREEMENT 
LEAD TIME NEEDED IS SUBSTANTIAl 
PRODUCT! ON TECHNOLOGY 
UTILIZATION TECHNOLOGY 
COST IS HIGH 
COAL IS U.S. MID TERM SOLUTION 
-- PRODUCT! ON-TRANSPORTATION -USE PROBLEMS 
VARIETY OF SOURCES IN LONG RUN 
-- EMPHASIS ON RENEWABLE RESOURCES [ 4 ] 
a few years (1985) as continued increases in world demand put pres-
sure on OPEC production capacity. 
As we begin to phase out of gas and oil, alternative fuels must 
be developed [4]. This raises a host of additional concerns--
principally cost and time. We need to accept the fact that the 
cheap energy era is behind us, that the alternatives are all 
expensive, and that it will require long lead times to comn1ercially 
develop significant quantities. This includes changes at both the 
production and end use levels. A mid-term solution in the United 
States is coal. \Ve are becoming familiar with the environmental, 
transportation, conversion, and cost problems associated with a 
substantial switch to coal. Again this will take time. We are 
fortunate, however, to be blessed with a large share of the world 
coal reserves. Many countries do not have a similar mid-term 
solution. 
In the long run, a variety of energy resources will be used to 
meet our energy needs. Many of these, such as solar, biomass, 
nuclear, etc., are presently not cost effective or have other use 
or production problems that preclude widespread adoption at this 
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time. As the technical 
and cost problems are 
overcome, we can expect 
to see the new sources 
4. CURRENT POll CY DEBATE 
-- NEED TO BUY TIME 
-- CONSERVATION - STRETCH OUT SUPPLIES 
-- CONVERSION TO COAL 
providing a substantial 
part of our energy needs. 
The expected price 
increases for fossil fuels 
-- STRONG FOCUS ON TRANSPORTATION (AUTOMOBILD 
will accelerate these 
developments. 
This is the arena in 
which the current policy 
-- USES OIL (IMPORTEDI 
-- LIMITED FUEL ALTERNATIVE 
-- CONSERVATION CAPABILITY 
-- EQUITABLE PRICING OF FUELS 
-- SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONSHIP 
-- WEALTH TRANSFERS 
INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE 
-- INCENTIVES TO CONSERVE 
debate is taking place. The need to buy time for conversion to 
alternative fuels is clear [5]. Thus, there is a strong effort 
to conserve nonessential uses of energy and thereby stretch out 
existing supplies of gas and oil. Coal is a mid-term solution, 
and significant rewards and penalties are being discussed as a 
means to increase production and hasten conversion to coal use. 
[5] 
The automobile occupies a center stage position in the policy 
debate. It is a large user of liquid fuel (oil) which is imported 
in increasingly large quantities. There are limited alternative 
fuels presently available for transportation use, and significant 
savings in gasoline use can be accomplished without seriously 
affecting life style. These facts all combine to make the auto-
mobile a principle target in our national conservation effort. 
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With rapidly rising energy prices, an OPEC monopoly pricing 
structure, regulated u.s. producer prices, and the need to use 
price signals as incentives to spur domestic production and 
conservation, much of the heat in the policy debate will turn 
on the pricing questions. There will be gainers and losers in the 
pricing decisions. Tremendous wealth transfers are possible, and 
special interest group pressures are intense. 
To summarize the future outlook, it appears that oil prices 
will show only moderate increases before 1980 [6]. North Slope 
and North Sea oil will take up the slack for a few years. However, 
during the 1980's, 
world production 
limitations will 
result in significant 
price increases as 
countries bid up the 
prices for the 
limited supplies of 
oil. We can expect 
a rekindling of 
5 FU1URE OUTLOOK 
-- MODERATE PRICE INCREASE TO 1980 
-- OIL SUPPLIES FROM NORTH SLOPE AND ~ORTH SEA 
SUBSTANTIAL PRICE INCREASES IN 1980's 
-- DEMAND WILL EXCEED OPEC CAPACITY 
-- SIGNIFICANT INFLATION 
-- LOWER GROWTH RATE 
[ 6] 
inflation to accompany this price rise and somewhat lower growth 
rates or even economic declines as industrial economies once more 
adJust to a relative change in energy pr1ces. 
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The Energy Policy Dilemma 
We now turn to a closer look at the process of public policy 
making. Energy policy must resolve many conflicting interests 
and may be approached from several different perspectives [7]. 
Three are suggested here. They include: (1) a time perspective, 
(2) an economic perspective, and (3) a political perspective. 
Economic and political considerations, even if considered separ-
ately, would result in substantial disagreement between special 
interests. The appropriate time 
frame in which to consider 
economic and political 
questions adds an addi-
tional area of controversy. 
This debate and disagreement 
is heightened further when 
we consider all perspectives 
simultaneously in an attempt 
to evolve a single national 
energy policy in a short 
period of time. Let's 
look more closely at each 
perspective. 
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THE ENERGY POLICY DILEMMA 
WHICH PERSPECTIVE :::> 
[ 7] 
A TIME PERSPECTIVE 
- - A COLD WINTER 
- - THE ROAD TO 1985 
- - BEYOND 1985 
The first is a 
time perspective [8]. 
Here the energy problem 
can be conveniently 
divided into three 
levels. The first, 
is the very short run, 
which I have descriptively 
labeled, "the cold winter" 
[9]. At this level, 
policy is concerned with 
immediate energy problems, 
such as allocation of 
short supplies, reducing 
bottlenecks in distribu-
[ 8] 
THE COLD WINTER 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
(SHORT RUN) 
[ 9] 
tion, establishing rate structures, and similar situations. These 
short run concerns must be met, however, they must not dominate 
policy. Longer run structural changes must be made as well to 
avoid greater short run problems down the road. 
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POLICY ALONG 
THE ROAD TO 1985 
[ 10] 
The second or intermediate term level is called "Policy 
along the road to 1985" and focuses on the expected shortfall in 
world oil production during the 1980's [10]. Policy at this 
level deals with measures needed to avoid the economic consequence 
of a significant increase in energy prices. Since the time is 
short, major emphasis is on conserving existing energy supplies, 
conversion to alternatives such as coal and incentives to increase 
domestic production. This intermediate level policy is the focus 
of the Administration's proposal and the current debate in Congress. 
Since this is of immediate concern for policy resolution, it is 
also the principal focus of the remainder of this report. 
- li-
POLICY FOR 
BEYOND 1985 
[11] 
The third level is the long run, or "beyond 1985r [11]. 
Policy at this level is concerned with developing energy systems 
that do not rely on finite energy sources such as gas and oil. 
Here we are concerned with identifying the proper energy forms 
and concentrating research and development efforts to bring 
them on stream sufficiently early to allow a smooth transition. 
Clearly, work must proceed at all three levels simultaneously. 
The danger is that we may become too preoccupied with the 
lmmediate short-run problems and neglect the charting of the 
long-run course. Agaln, the costs and needed lead times to 
change energy systems are great. We must look down the road, 
around the bend to 1985 and beyond, and begin to make our mld-
course correctlons soon. 
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A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
- - CONSUMERS 
- - PRODUCERS 
- - POliCY MAKERS [12] 
The political ENERGY IS EVERYONE'S CONCERN 
perspective is at the 
heart of policy-making [12]. 
This is especially trouble-
some in the energy area, 
since everyone has a 
stake in the outcome of 
energy policy [13]. Not 
surprisingly each of us 
A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
is looking to Uncle Sam [ 13] 
to help us resolve our 
own special energy problems. In addition, we recognize a broader 
national concern that must be addressed by policy as well. As 
we try to sort out our individual interests and see how they 
relate to a broader national policy, it lS important that we 
recognize the legitimate concerns and problems of other partici-
pants in the energy policy debate. Thls is essential if we are 
to have an effective natlonal policy. 
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1} 
2) 
3) 
1H£ POUCY PARTICIPANTS 
ENERGY DEMAND {CONSUMERS) 
MR. N. R. G. GUZZ 
MRS. MIDA MERICA 
AUNT EMMA [14] 
Who are some of the key policy partlcipants in the cur-
rent debates? Starting on the demand side, we can identify 
several that represent a broad cross-section of individuals [14]. 
The first is Mr. N. R. G. Guzz (15]. We are all represented 
at least a little bit by Mr. Guzz. Gas guzzling cars, heat 
wasting homes, and extravagant life styles that depend on a large 
use of energy to maintain or expand our way of life are examples. 
Implied as well is the necessary income to support this habit. 
Happily or unhappily, as the case may be, significant savings 
are possible by altering 
~r. Guzz's behavior without 
seriously affecting the 
way he lives. Thus, he 
lS a prime target for 
conservation incentives. 
MR NRG GUZZ 
[ 15 J 
- 1 h -
Mrs. Mida Merica represents 
the average situation [16]. It 
is important to recognize two 
things here. First, to be 
MRS MIOA MERICA 
effective, energy policy and 
the implied adjustments must be 
borne to some extent by all of 
us, not just Mr. Guzz. Second, 
to be accepted, policy has to be 
supported by a majority of the [16] 
people. Thus, middle America 
has to participate in, and poli-
tically support, national energy 
policy if it is to be effective. 
Finally, we have to recog-
nize the special situation of 
Aunt Emma [17]. Aunt Emma 
represents that segment of 
society on fixed or low income 
which will, in the short run 
at least, bear an unjust burden 
from rapidly rising energy 
prices. Policy must be 
humanitarian as well and take 
into account the special AUN1 EMMA 
[17] 
Aunt Emma situations. 
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ENERGY SUPPLY (PRODUCERS) 
1) MR. 0. BARON 
2) MR. NU WELLS 
3) MONOPOLY SHEIK 
4) PIPER LINES 
5] MISS SCI TECH 
On the supply side, we also 
have many participants [18]. I 
have elected to concentrate on oil 
suppliers in developing represen-
tative situations, since the policy 
debate is centered largely on the 
o~l problem. Others could be 
substituted easily. 
Mr. 0. Baron leads off the 
cast [19]. He represents what has 
come to be known as "old oil". He 
is the principal source of current 
domestic production and finds his 
price regulated, at a low level. 
Mr. Nu Wells represents new dis-
coveries of domestic oil [20]. 
He finds a regulated price also, 
but at a more attractive level. 
Mr. 0. Baron and Mr. Nu Wells are 
vitally interested and ~nvolved in 
the debates over price deregulation 
and well head taxes. 
- 18 -
[181 
MR 0 BARON 
[ 19] 
MR NU WELLS 
[ 2 0] 
Monopoly Sheik is a new but 
very important actor in the energy 
arena [21]. He entered the contest 
in force in 1973, and permanently 
changed the economic rules of the 
game. We have little policy 
influence over his behavior but 
must adapt our policy to account 
for his actions. He can change 
the supply and price of interna-
tional oil without the normal MONOPOLY SHEIK 
regard for market forces. As we [21] 
become more dependent on imported 
oil, hls power and influence 
increase. 
An alternative to imported 
oil is increased domestic pro-
duction. As established domestic 
reserves are used up, however, 
we must increasingly look to 
more remote and costly explora-
tion for additional Oll. Off-
shore productlon on the con-
tinental shelf and Alaskan 
PIPER LINES 
oil are represented by [ 2 2] 
Piper Lines [22]. 
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Finally, if we are to make 
an orderly transfer to alter-
native fuels, we must develop 
the scientists and research 
facilities and provide the 
research and development support 
to bring the new sources on 
stream in a timely manner. Miss 
Sci Tech will be among the peo-
ple that help supply the new 
ideas and methods needed beyond 
1985 [23]. 
These people and interests 
MISS SCI TECH 
represent a cross section of the 
[23] 
consumer and producer participants 
in the current policy debate. 
Our cast of policy participants, 
however, would be incomplete 
without the politicians them-
selves [24]. 
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POLICY 
1) UNCLE SAM 
2) HOMETOWN REP 
[24] 
Uncle Sam represents the 
national interest, where we are 
turning increasingly for the 
resolution of energy problems 
[25]. He may be thought of as 
the executive and administrative 
arm of government. 
Hometown Rep is a critical 
participant [26]. He can recog-
nize broad national problems, 
but he represents regional inter-
ests and is particularly attuned 
to the "folks back home". He is 
an extension of the public will. 
When and to the extent middle 
America is ready for a national 
energy program he will support 
it. In some cases, he is a 
barometer of how we all feel. 
- 21 -
UNCLE SAM 
[ 2 5 J 
HOMETOWN 
REP 
[26] 
THE ENERGY SITUATION 
The policy participants 
have been introduced. We turn 
now to a more detailed look at the 
energy s1tuation they are debating 
in terms of our present use, sup-
U.S. ENERGY BUDGET 
(1977) 
/ 
1/4 IMPORTED 
OIL 
1/4 GAS 
ply projections, and energy 
pricing. These are the elements \ ~~~ \ 1/4 DOMESTIC I I 1/5 COAL ~ 
that collectively determine the 
I I I I 
\ OIL i 1 II 
nature of the energy problem. 
The current energy budget for 
' 
"" I I ~~ 'I ,~ ~ L----- [ 27] 
the U.S. can be divided approxi-
mately in quarters, one for imported oil, another for domestic oil 
production, and a third quarter for natural gas [27]. Thus, oil 
accounts for about one-half of our total use, oil and gas together 
for about 75 percent. Coal at 20 percent and all others uses at 
5 percent round out the total. Gas, oil and coal, our fossil fuels--
account for 95 percent of total energy use in the United States. 
It's no wonder that impending shortages of fuels that make up 
three-fourths of our energy budget cause concern. 
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The factors that 
lead to the impending 
shortages of gas and 
oil are generally 
agreed upon. First, 
u.s. production, after 
rislng steadily for many 
years finally peaked in 
the 1970's and has 
S0'11et and US Crude 011 Product1on 
~lill1on BID 
12 
10 
[28] 
gradually declined since [28]. Over this period, new discoveries 
have not kept pace with the depletion of established reserves. 
Petroleum use, however, has continued to increase, and to meet 
this demand, imports have risen dramatically to half of our oil 
use. 
The Soviet Union is a sleeper in the impending energy crisis. 
Her production has increased quite rapidly, and she has ample 
proven reserves. Production in older oil fields in the Soviet 
Union, however, is declining, and she does not have the technology 
and capital to develop the new reserves fast enough. Thus, Soviet 
oil production will also decline soon, and may be at a high point 
now. She will have to curtail exports of oil to Eastern European 
countries and may have to resort to imports as well. Recent 
modest long run agreements with Iran to supply the Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European countries with oil underscore the 
domestic production problems being encountered in the Soviet Union. 
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This will lead to greater 
demand for OPEC oil [29]. While 
excess OPEC capacity now exists, 
it is likely that this will be 
rapidly used up to satisfy increased 
demand from the u.s., the Soviet 
so 
Union, Japan, and other importing 4" 
countrles. Once production capa-
<o 
city llmlts are reached, higher 
prices Wlll be the only way to 
20 
ration the oil among the many 
bidders. Thus the impending 
crlsls is a familiar economic one 
of supply and demand factors leading 
to strongly higher prices. 
[ 2 9] 
Oi'EC 011 The Supply/Demand Gap 
OPEC Productive Capac1tv 
Exce11 rapac1tv 
SuptJiy 
Shortfall 
80 81 82 g, 84 8S 
The 1985 appointment, then, is with an energy price wall that 
Wlll cause us serious economic problems if we continue our addic-
tion to Mr. Guzz's habit [30]. As noted before, temporary rellef 
from North Slope and North Sea oil wlll mask this problem until 
about 1980. Following this period however, prices, in reaction to 
productlon capacity constraints will rlse sharply. 
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THE 1985 APPOINTMENT 
The 1985 poJ~cy alter-
native is to begin adjusting 
to the higher price situation 
now with gradual, rather than 
sharp, increases and through 
[ 30] 
OR THE 1985 ALTERNATIVE 
conservation to help stretch [31] 
out supplies, reduce imports, and hopefully delay the 1985 appo~nt 
ment for a few years [31]. We probably can not avoid a bump ~n 
the road about 1985, but hopefully through act~on taken now, 
major economic d~sruptions can be dampened. 
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Since the problem is one 
of prices, let's look briefly 
at the pricing picture for the 
various energy sources [32]. 
U.S. ENERGY PRICES --1'117 
!WELLHEAD. U.S PORT OR MINE MOUTH! 
Clearly, short-run substitution 
of energy sources is difficult, 
PER BARREL OF OIL EQUIVALENT 
but in the long run it is 
possible to make substantial 
shifts. Since prices at the 
well head are regulated, 
there now exist a series of 
oil prices that range from a 
low of just over $5.00 a 
barrel for old oil, to a high 
of about $17.00 for oil from 
the North Slope. This $17.00 
price is composed of $11.00 at 
the well head in Alaska and 
another $6.00 to bring it 
through the pipeline and on 
OIL 
GAS 
OLD CONTROLLED 
NEW (SECOND Tl ERl 
IMPORTED 
SHALE OIL 
NORTI-!SLOPE (ALAS KAl 
TAR SANDS 
LIOUI D COAL 
INTERSTATE (0LDl 
INTERSTATE (NEW! 
INTRASTATE INEWl 
NOR TI-l SLOPE 
SHALE GAS 
LNG - IMPORTED 
SNG -COAL 
COAL 
WES lERN COAL 
EASlERN COAL 
board ships to the lower 48 states. 
$ 5. 25-.._ $8. 60 
11.28/ 
13.00 
15.00 
17 00 
18 00 
25.00 
$ 3.00 
9.00 
10.00 
17. ()() 
20.00 
20.00 
24.00 
$ 3. 00 
700 
[ 32] 
Regulated gas prcies show a similar pricing structure. In 
both cases, the new sources of energy are considerably more costly 
than conventional gas and oil. 
The world price of oil is established by the OPEC cartel. 
This oil was costing the U.S. about $13.00 per barrel in 1977 [33]. 
This sets a price that is coveted by old and new producers in the 
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¥ rm~• 
THE PRICE DILEMMA 
U S ENERGY PRICES ll'l771 r- ,.._.., 
$25 
,) s 27 -
- (\ 
>- $20 r~ ~ 20 r- (.!) 0 a:: 
0 lJJ z JM~~ ~· r- lJJ "' I' 1.1.. $15 1-"' r--< 0 WORLD PRICE 1977 
"' 
WORLD PRICE 119771 
e; 13 
"' 
lJJ $13 ~ "- s ~ ~(, ;; ~ .---r-,.-- a: $10 ::: 10 t; § a. If "' 0.. 1 mported "-9 .--- new oil l.i! 0 new Oil ~ ~ $5 ~ J ,.----- roal {)JS P- ~ old ~ ~ I t"d<f c- ~ ~ I 01d ~ oil ~ " -' -; );/ \~ .:~ t:.-~ I " " -s; :;; _g I " gas ,, c :;; I 
--- QUANTITY OF ENERGY USED (10771 -- QUANTITY OF ENERGY 
[ 3 3] 
u.s. and raises serious questions about whether this is a true 
market price that should be honored for U.S. producers. Some 
feel that supply and demand should be allowed to work even if 
the supply is held artificially low by the OPEC cartel. Others 
note that supplies already discovered do not require higher 
prices for their production, and monopoly or windfall profits 
should not be allowed across the board. They also argue that 
the resulting wealth transfers from consumers to producers would 
be substantial, and while higher prices to consumers may be 
justified to encourage conservation, it is better to achieve this 
through a taxing mechanism and then direct the proceeds to devel-
oping alternative energy sources. 
This is the energy situation within which the political 
participants are debating national energy policy. Next, we want 
to examine the third or economic perspective to energy policy. 
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AN ECONOMIC PERSPECT1VE TO 
ENERGY POLICY 
The market, it's support, 
manipulation, and control are 
at the heart of economic 
DEMAND ),JPP! \ 
pol1cy. An understand1ng 
\\ 
of the efficiencies and ~ I limitations of the market, 
therefore, are basic to an 
interpretation of economic I 
policy for energy. Let's 
JlN nn 
start with an examination [34) 
of the supply and demand 
situation. First, we will provide a little theory so everyone 
understands what is meant by supply and demand [34]. Supply and 
demand refer to a relationship between the quantity and price of 
energy. At higher prices people will demand less, while at low 
prices they will demand more. Therefore, the demand curve slopes 
down to the right. Supply is just the opposite. At higher prices 
producers will supply more, while at lower prices less will be made 
available. Accordingly the supply curve slopes upward to the 
right. Happily, these two curves cross, and at that point the 
amount demanded exactly equals the amount supplied. It is this 
energy price, where supply and demand are equal, that the free 
market establishes. 
- 28 -
0 
0 
~ 
"' 
"' <
"' ffi 
"-
~ 
u 
"' -
ENERGY SUPPLY CURVE 
S?S 
?0 
~ 
~/ 
/ IS / ;:. 
u 
"" ~.., "-10 .. 4- u 
~ 
~ 
2 
19?0 s 19o0 s 
OUM T!TY 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
[35] 
...1 
0 
II.. 
0 
...1 
1.1.1 
a: 
a: 
<( 
ID$5.00 
a: 
1.1.1 
Q. 
1.1.1 
u 
ii: 
Q. 
ENERGY SUPPLY a DEMAND 
~ )/'~ 
1950's- 1960's 
QUANTITY 
[36] 
Now if we consider the various energy prices discussed 
earlier, we can see that they comprise a long run supply curve 
[35]. Old oil prices established earlier are the basis for the 
supply curve during the 1950's and 1960's [36]. Most of our 
supply came from domestic sources, and we perceived of the supply 
as inexhaustible. Therefore, the supply curve was thought of as 
largely horizontal. In other words, we could have all the energy 
we needed at that price. Under these conditions we rapidly 
increased our demand for oil. 
By the 1970's, u.s. production was declining and OPEC oil 
was being imported in larger quantities. The OPEC countries per-
ceived correctly that we were running low on u.s. supplies and 
were not inclined to slow down Hr. Guzz in his thirst for more 
energy. Accordingly they raised the price of oil, and then our 
supply curve took on the more traditional slope, upward to the 
right [37). 
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Now as we look ahead to our appointment w1th 1985, production 
capacity will be reached and the supply curve will therefore 
approx1mate a vertical position since in the short-run additional 
supplies will not be available at any price [38]. The fear lS that 
if we don't curb Mr. Guzz's appetite, he will push demand to this 
po1nt and then since no additional supply will be available, a 
rap1d 1ncrease ln price will be necessary to ration the fixed 
amount of oil being produced. Thus, the 1985 appointment is an 
econom1c problem of an increasing demand pushing against a rela-
t1vely fixed supply. Accordingly, the 1985 alternative as proposed 
by the Administration is to re1n in Mr. Guzz and curb our demand 
for energy whlle at the same t1me provlding incentives to 1ncrease 
the supply [39]. Taken together, these actions are expected to 
prov1de for a lower market clearing price where supply and demand 
are equated -- a price that will cause less disruptions to our 
economy. 
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How will this be accom-
pllsned? On the demand side 
we have suggestions for a 
series of standards, tax 
incentives, rebates, and 
CARlER PROPOSAL 
Al DECREASE DEMAND 
I GAS GUZZLER TAX 
2. MAND I TORY MILEAGE STANDARDS 
3 REBATE ON COMPACTS 
4 TAX INCENTIVES 
FUEL CONVERSION - INDUSTRY 
INSULATION 
SOLAR HEATING 
5 WELLHEAD TAX-- OLD OIL 
6 INCREASE GAS PUMP TAX 
7 NO VOLUME DIS COUNTS (UTI Ll TY RATES l 
B\ INCREASE SUPPLY 
TAX INCENTIVES-- FUEL CONVERSION 
2. NEW OIL EQUAL TO WORLD OIL PRICE (1977\ 
3. NEW GAS EQUAL TO WORLD 01 L PRICE (1977\ 
C\ EXCEPTIONS [ 4 0] 
prlclng structures that will increase the cost of energy use to 
cons~mers and thus reduce demand [40]. On the supply side, price 
incentives for new oil and gas and for fuel conversion will hope-
fully increase supplies of gas and oil. It is important to note 
that these proposals are not independent. Though they are often 
consldered and debated separately and defended or crlticized on 
different bases; in the end it is the collective impact they all 
have on reducing demand and increasing supply and thus keeping 
energy prices within acceptable limits that will determine the 
success of the current policy debate. 
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POLICY AND 
ENERGY ECONO ICS 
It is clear that the economic perspective for energy is 
changing rapidly. Supplies are becoming short, prices are in-
creasing and markets, both domesLic and i~t~rnational, are 
coming under greater control either through government or mono-
poly action. The prospects are that these conditions will 
intensify in the future. 
What s1gnificance do these changing economic conditions 
have for energy pol1cy? In the earlier period of perceived 
resource (energy) abundance, the role of public policy was 
basically a fac1litating one as it helped the market to adjust 
supply and demand. As we pass into an era of scarcity of energy, 
however, lt is certa1n that the role of policy will increase. 
Why ls this so? Let's look at several results of a change from 
resource abundance to scarcity to 1dentify the factors leading 
to 1ncreased need for policy act1on. 
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WORLD VIEW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
- RESOURCE ABUNDANCE -g G, 
I 
~
[41] 
WCRLD VIEW OF 
THF UNITED STATES 
- RESOURCE SCARCITY-
[ 4 2] 
First, at the international level, the u.s. and its economic 
engine has been admired and emulated as a development model by 
most of the world [41]. This was especially true when we were 
producing a range of attractive goods mostly from our own re-
sources. 
However, now that our resources are becoming depleted and we 
increasingly turn to world markets to satisfy our appetite for 
more energy and other resources, we come into more direct compe-
tition with areas such as Japan and Europe which have tradition-
ally relied on OPEC supplies [42]. This situation will increaslng: 
cause strain in our international relations and must be considered 
a part of the energy policy framework. 
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On the domestic 
FREE MARKET ECONOMICS -RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 
scene, when energy 
is abundant and low 
in cost, the market 
allocates the sup-
plies efficiently 
and Mr. Guzz and 
Aunt Emma each in 
their own way find 
sufficient quanti-
ties at acceptable 
prices [43]. 
However, under scarce sup-
plies, as we have seen, the market 
rations these supplies on the 
basls of price; thus most energy 
goes to the highest bidder, in 
this case Mr. Guzz [44]. If 
energy, was a non-essential com-
modity, there would be little 
policy concern over scarce sup-
plies. However, we consider 
energy as a necessity for our 
way of life and become concerned 
FREE MARKET 
ECONOMICS 
RESOURCE SCARCITY 
[44] 
as a society when some individuals are denied access to a suffi-
cient supply of energy. 
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This condition leads to demands 
by certain groups in society for 
intervention in the market [45]. 
This intervention is triggered by 
two conditions: (1) a scarce 
resource that is perceived of as 
a necessity, such as energy or 
food, and (2) unequal purchasing 
power among individuals so that 
everyone can not bid equally for 
the scarce commodity. Clearly, the 
current conditions of our society 
and it's energy supplies meet 
these two criteria, and thus we 
can expect increasing intervention 
in the market. What forms will 
this take? 
The first, "Aunt Emma Econo-
mics", is to provide rebates for 
poor and fixed income people who 
cannot afford high energy prices 
[46). In the long run some 
adJustment will have to be made 
in living style, but the heating 
FREE MARKET 
INTERVENTION 
AUNT EMMA ECONOMICS 
[ 4 6 J 
bills must be paid this winter. Proposals providing for this 
form of rebate have already been introduced and passed into law. 
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"Robin Hood Economics" has 
ROBIN HOOD ECONOMICS 
been a feature of our tax struc-
ture for many years [47]. How-
ever, as the impact of higher 
energy prices become more 
severe, pressure will lncrease 
to further dlstribute the tax 
burdens to those who can afford 
lt. Tax rellef for poorer 
people, for example, was one 
of the initial proposals for 
dlsposition of a wellhead tax 
on oil. 
"Two by Four Economics" or 
outright regulatlons is another 
economic policy that accompanies 
scarcity [48]. Price regulation 
will continue to be a strongly 
debated toplc. Consumer 
ratlonlng ls possible if 
lmport supplies are inter-
rupted for any reason. TWO BY FOUR ECONOMICS [ 4 8] 
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"Cartel or Monopoly 
Economics" is difficult to deal 
with when 1t is used against 
you [49]. It carries the possi-
bil1ty of interrupted supplies 
and thus elicits non-market 
policies such as reserve stock-
piling to deal with it. It is 
likely that in the energy area, 
the OPEC monopoly will not 
CARTEL (MONOPOLY! ECONOMICS 
[49] 
persist for very long. It is needed and effective only as long 
as production capacity (supply) exceeds potential demand. When 
production capacities are reached, price will rise independent 
of any action taken by the cartel. At that point, which is now 
forecast for the mid-1980's, we will likely see the oil producers 
acting more independently. In some sense, the OPEC cartel may 
have done us a favor by giving an early warning to get our energy 
affairs in order. 
"Environmental Economics" lS also assuming increasing 1mpor-
tance as we displace more land in our search for energy and dis-
charge more undesirable residuals from energy use into an in-
creas1ngly overburdened environment [50]. The temptation is 
strong to relax standards in a drive to produce and consume more 
and more energy. 
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However, a long-run perspective 
demands that we adopt a balanced ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
approach to energy use that does 
respect the environment. 
"Futura Economics" is the 
final adjustment we must begin 
to cons~der [51]. The free 
market -- made up of b~dders 
and sellers today has a 
short plann~ng horizon. 
Tommorrow's c1tizens are not [50] 
here to b1d on and share ~n 
these scarce resources. If 
they were, they would perhaps 
outbid us for the1r use. We 
FUTURA ECONOMICS 
haven't pa1d much attention 
to these future generat1on 
demands. However, as essen-
tial resources dwindle and we 
consider alternatives such 
as nuclear energy wh1ch may 
leave res~duals for thousands 
of years or mass~ve burning of 
coal, we must begin to measure 
[51] 
the costs to future genera-
t~ons of actions we take 
today. 
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ENERGY POLICY CROSSROADS 
CARTER S VIEW 
/ 
[52] 
Th1s leads us then to the Energy Policy crossroads, "Which 
Road to 1985?"[52]. We have made some adJustment s1nce the early 
1970's, but Mr. Guzz is st1ll largely unchanged. The Adm1nistra-
tion has po1nted out that our present path holds perils down the 
road about 1985. President Carter's proposal is one alternative 
path. It suggests taking some irnnediate steps to curb energy 
demand and increase both conventional and new sources of supply. 
There are many other alternatives requiring more or less adjust-
ments than suggested by President Carter. 
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THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS ? 
[53] 
The view from Congress, which as suggested earlier is 
really an extension of how we as voters feel about the energy 
s1tuation, is to opt for a somewhat less rigorous path [53). 
The differences between the Administration and Congress are 
matters of degree and emphasis. The emphasis in Congress is more 
on increasing supplies of conventional sources and less on 
conservation. Neither has placed strong emphasis on the develop-
ment of alternative fuels. Again, the initial energy program will 
be only a first step. There will undoubtedly be many mid-course 
corrections as we approach closer to 1985 and get a better view 
of events around the bend in the road. 
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A NECESSARY CONDITION 
[54] 
Finally, with the many conflicting interests in the energy 
equation, the resulting national energy policy must have broad 
public participation and support if it is to be effective [54]. 
Several positive features seem to be evolving from the current 
debate. First, the existence of a potentially serious energy 
problem has been acknowledged by most, and the need to take 
immediate steps to begin the long and difficult transition from 
abundant cheap energy to a scarce high cost energy situation is 
recognized. Perhaps more significantly, the political proces 
has moved fairly expeditiously toward providing a national 
program. Whether this program will be sufficient to meet the 
magnitude of the problem however, is still uncertain. 
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